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HT 'rHE SUPRE11E COUR'C' OF TIIF

STATE OF UT.\!!

STATE OF UTZ\H,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 15550

JAMES M. GRAY,

Defendant-Aprellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellant was charged with burglary, a felony of
the second degree, in violation of
Annotated

§

76-6-202, Utah Code

(1953) as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

Appellant was tried before a jury in the Fourth
Judicial Court of Utah County, the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson
presiding, on November 1, 1977.

Appellant was found guilty

and sentenced to serve a term of one to fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison.
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f\Ef,lE"' SmTG!lT 0;1 ll.PPf'\L

Respondent seeks an order of this Court afEirning
the judgment of the lower court.
STATH!ENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of September 18, 1977, at aporoximat
7:00 p.m. in the evening, appellant and one James Richard
Butters burglarized a trailer situated on a construction site
and occupied by one Charles LeHoy Stanley, the superintenderu
of construction on that site.

Mr. Stanley was out of town

at the time the hurglary occurred.

After breaking the windm

on the door of the trailer and breaking ooen two side
compartments, appellant and Butters removed several items
belonging to Mr. Stanley from the premises.
At the trial, the State called, among others, Kent
Curtis

(Tr. p. 27), an Adult Probation and Parole Officer

for the State of Utah, who had been with the investigating
officers at the time appellant was brought in for guestionirr
and subsequently participated in the search of the motel roa
where several of the stolen items were recovered.

In establ

foundation for this witness, the prosecutor asked Kent
Curtis to state his name and his occupation (Tr. p. 27).
Mr. Curtis then recited his name and stated that he was a
Probation and Parole Officer for the

St~te

of Utah
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(Tr. p.

The nrosecutor then ask-=d '1.m·1 long ';r. Curtis had known
appellant to which the witness respondent "approximately
ten years."

(Tr. p.

28).

'1r. Curtis then proceeded to

testify about the search macle hv himself and Officers Lance and
Downard

(Tr. p.

28).

During the cross-examination of State's witness,
Ronald Ziegler, later in the trial, defense counsel, asked
Mr.

Ziegler how long he had known appellant, to which Mr.

Ziegler respondent,
(Tr. 53).

"about a little over two and

ii

half years."

A subsequent inquiry was made as to where the witness

and appellant had first met and Mr.
the nrison."

Ziegler replied, "At

(Tr. p. 54).

The jury returned a verdict of guilty and appellant
was sentenced to serve a term of one to fifteen years at the
Utah State Prison.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN THAT HIS
REPRESENTATION BY APPOI:-JTED COU~JSEL
MET THE REQlIIRED STANDARD OF A
COMPETE!JT MEMBER OF THE BAR RENDERING
REASONABLE EFFECTIVE .Z\.SSISTAHCE.
Several Utah Supreme Court cases hold that when
an appellant is claiming he has been denied effective
represenation, the court must look to the record to determine
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if arrcllant's contention has
Utah 2d 103, 3ti8 ?.'2c1 914

~erit.

(1962); State v. Doc'q·.J,

44, 425 P.2d 781 (1967); and State v. Heath,
492 P. 2c1 978

(1972).

19 Utah 2d

27 Utdh 2d 13,

Justice Crockett surrunari7.ed this

frequent objection raised by appellants in the recent case o
State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d 1313

(J974)

when

he Si:id:
"In regard to the defendant's
contention that he was denied effective
counsel: we are impelled to remark
that it is nothing less than shameful
thctt our la''' seems to have degenerated
to a point where whenever an accused
is convicted of cri~e, the charge of
inco~petencv of counsel is, with ever
increasing frequency, leveled at
capable attorneys who have given
entirely adequate service, when the
real difficulty was that he had a guilty
client.
In this respect also defendant had his entitlement of adequate
representatio·nby capable and conscientious
counsel." Id. at 1315
Nothing in the present record indicates that
appellant was denied effective counsel.

Appellant contends,

however, that his representation was so ineffective that it
failed to meet the standard of reasonably effective assistar
rendered by a competent member of the Bar.

Appellan~

bases

his argument on several aspects of the conduct of the trial,
concluding that even though any one matter in and of itself
might not require a reversal, the entire transcriot oresents
a picture of a completely inadequate defense.

This argument

is not sustained by the record or cases dealing with the iss
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~~is

2d 112.,

4~,')

Court enunciat0C in Alires v.

P.20 241

22 Utah

~urncr,

(196'1), thr:e test to b:- usccd whenever

the question of ineffective counsel is raised.

In Alires,

the court first stated that the right of an accused to coansel
is included in the concept of due process of law, embodied
as it is in the Unitec States and Utah Constitutions.

The

requirement of counsel, said the Court:
. is not satisfied by a
sham or pretense of an appearance
in the record by an attorney who
manifests no real concern about the
interests of the accused."
Id.at 242
Immediately following the above statement, the court indicated
the standard required by due orocess to be applied to appointed
counsel:
"The entitlement is to the
assistance of a competent member of
the Bar, who shows a willin~ness
to identify himself with the interests
of the defendant and present such
defenses as are available to him
under the law and consistent with
the ethics of the profession."
Id. at 121.
This standard has been consistently
the Utah Supreme Court.

reaffir~ed

by

See Johnsonv. Turner, 24 Utah 2d

439, 473 P.2d 901 (1970); Kryger v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 214,
479 P. 2c1 477

(1971); State v. McNicol,

-5-

55~

P.

2d 203

(Utah 1976).
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supnort of hi~ ar~,.ument th·1t he r('Cei. 1f".'_'rJ
sist2nc~

do not establi:::;'.1 u

s[l,::_:1rn

by the attorney rei:-i1·esentin<:J hiT1,

.inr:f'.:r;cti_,_,c us-

or 0retens2 nF an
!'O.C

et-Jpea1~?1.nct

is ther0 any rc,flectior

in the record of a lack of concern about the interes'c:s of
appellant.
Appellant contends that his defense

couns~l

failed

to make proper objections to admission of certain evic1ence,
failed to satisfactorily cross-examine

witnesses, fcliled to

adequately probe possible defenses, and failed to exclude
witnesses during the trial.

All of these matters are often

a method of trial strategy, individual to each attorney, and
cannot he said to indicate lack of concern by the attorney
his client or ineffective representation.

See State v.

~

McN~

544 P.2d 293 (Utah 1976), where the court concluded that
failure to object, brief direct examination and failure to
pursue certain matters fell "within the ambit of an attorney
legitimate exercise of judgment as to trial tactics or stratE
and State v. Farni, 112 Ariz. 132, 539 P.2d 889

(1975) where

the court concluded that failure of defense counsel to cross·
exanine one witness and question others on certain points wa!
tactical decision.
Appellant contends that the trial record, read as
a whole, reflects a completely inadequate defense requiring
reversal and a new trial.

Appellant states that "[a] reading
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of

e•r( n the• first

FE·.1

pages of the transcript demonstrates

that, for whatever reason, trial counsel was unable to
cu~municate

clearly with either the judge, jury, or witnesses,"

thereby suggesting to the court that it read the trial
transcript in part or in its entirety.
Respondent would join in this request to the Court.
However, respondent submits that the record satisfies the
standard established in Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118,
449 P.2d 241 (1969), i.e. of reasonably effective assistance
rendered by a competent member of the Bar.
If the court should find that any of the particulars
raised by appellant herein do not meet the above standard,
one further inquiry must be made.

The court must determine

whether there.is some basis for believing that a better representation by counsel would have been advantageous to
appellant at trial.

As the court stated in Alires v. Turner,

supra:
"This is so because it is the
policy of our law established both
by statute and decision that we do
not reverse for mere error or
irregularity, but only where it is
substantial and prejudicial." Alires v.
Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 120.
The particular matters cited by appellant as
evidence of ineffective representation by defense counsel

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ca!'.not be said, st.:inc1ing nl.Ol'C' or as ·< F'.1ole, to ha,re hn.d
such an effect upon the result - app2lJ.rnt's con-Jiction of
burglary - as to requirro a

nc\·.'

trial.

7\ssuminq for the sake

of argument that the defense attorney herein failed to make
proper objections to admission of certain evidence, failed t
satisfactorily cross-examine witnesses, failed to adequately
probe defenses, and failed to exclude witnesses during trial
there is no viable reason to believe that the verdict would
have been different.
Appel!ant's allegations of ineffectiveness and
prejudice are merely speculative and are not a demonstrable
reality.

Therefore, ineffectiveness of counsel is Qerely

speculative at this point and the burden of proof still
rests clearly upon appellant.

In State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d

203 (Utah 1976), this court stated:
"A defendant bears the burden of
establishing the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of counsel, and proof
of such must be a demonstrable reality
and not a speculative matter."
Id. at 204.
In the instant case, the trial record reflects tha
appellant was properly represented by counsel so as not to
impair any of his constitutional rights.

Appellant exercise

the right, through counsel, to confront witnesses against hi

-8-
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his

lichalr.

m;1

before

ci

1ucy.
ThP record on anneal and the transcript of

the trial support

r'~s~-,ond2nt'

s

contention that appellant hQrein

was given legal representation by his appointed counsel which
satisfies the standard set by the Utah Suprene Court.
Appellant's defense attorney rendered reasonably effective
assistance of counsel as a conpetent rciemher of the Bar.

Hone

of the matters cited by appellant in arguing that his representation was so ineffective as to not meet the standard
set forth in Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241
(1969), either st?nding alone or as a whole, could be said
to have had such an effect on the verdict as to require a
reversal.
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POHJT II
REPORTING OF CLOSING ARGUMENT IN TRil\L
rs !WT CUSTOMARILY DONE UNLESS so
REQUESTED BY COUNSEL AND FAILURE OF
COUNSEL TO REQUEST REPORTING OF CLOSING
ARGUMENTS IS OFTEN A PLANNED STRATEGY
OH TRIAL TACTIC AND 'l'llEREF'ORE APPELLANT
lffiS NOT BEEN DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO
APPEAL.

Appellant contends that failure to report
closing

argum~nts

right to appeal.

has deprived him of his constitutional
Appellant further contends that the

essence of the right to appeal is that of review in
search of error, State v. McLaughlin, 22 Utah 2d 321,
324, 452 P.2d 75 (1969), and argues that this requires
a review of the entire proceedings in the

low~r

court

(Appellant's brief, p. 7).
Utah Code Ann.

§

78-56-2 (1953), as amended,

provides:
"[I)t shall be the duty of the
shorthand reporter to attend oll
sessions of the court, and to take
full stenographic notes of thPevidence given and of all proceedings
had the1:~,in except when the jurlc;e
dispenses with his services in- ~1-
partTcuTar cause or with resrec_t_ to
a portion of the proceedings thereof
."(Emphasis added.)
Respondent submits that the wording of the stat
allows the decision of whether the entire proceedings shi
be reported to be within the discretion of the judge and
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counsel.

It is not customarv in Utah for the court

stenographer to report the closing arguments of
counsel unless a request is made by counsel to do so
or the matter is a capital case.
247 So.2d 679

See Lane v. State,

(Ala. 1971), where the court, in

interpreting a statute similar to our own, determined
that the statute did not require the court reporter to
make full stenographic notes of the arguments of counsel.
The general rule (see 82 C.J.S.

§

9 at 1057}

is that the duties of the court stenographer are
prescribed by statute and as an official under the
control of the court, he is subject to its discretion.
See McCoy v. State, 2 S.W.2d 242 (Texas, 1927).

In

the absence of a constitutional or statutory provision
to the contrary, and absent a request by one of the
parties, it is discretionarv with the court whether
full stenographic notes of the arguments will be taken.
The duties of the stenographer include attending court,
being present or within call throughout the entire trial,
except during the arguments of counsel [see Magoohan v.
Curra__!"l, 42 A. 656, 71 Conn. 551 (1899), and State v.
~aum,

47 Utah 7, 151 Pac. 518 (1915)) so that the courts

and litigants ciln be protected by a complete record.
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As appellant contends, an appellate court
can reverse due to errors committed by counsel dur.ing
his argument; however, to do so it must have the rc'cord
of the closing arguments before it on appeal.

It is

well settled that the court on appeal is bound by the
record as certified and it can only take notice of
that which is part of the record as certified and
transmitted.

Bradley v. Lewis, 92 P.2d 399

(1939);

Marv Jane Stevens Co. v. Foley, 248 Pac. 815 (1926).
During closing argument, counsel makes a
summation of the evidence previously presented to the
court and whether or not counsel wishes to have the
closing arguments reported and therefore part of the
record, is often a strategy or trial tactic used
analogous to choosing whether to be tried before a
judge and jury or a judge alone; whether to testify or
exercise the constitutional right to remain silent;
whether to call witnesses to testify on defendant's
behalf, etc.

While an attorney may be criticized

for his judgment as to those matters, an exercise in
bad judgment, i.e., a poor choice, is not grounds for
reversal.
Although the closing arguments were not
transcribed, appellant is not without an alternative
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Depositions could have been
taken of the trial attorney and the prosecutor to
detcn1ine the content of the closing arguments of
trial and these depositions could have been designated
as part of the

recor~

on appeal.

Yet appellant

contends this failure to report closing arguments
has deprived him of his constitutional right to an
appeal of the entire record and in addition to exercising
his alternative, i.e., obtaining depositions, fails to
show prejudice or unfairness as a result of this failure
to report closing arguments in his brief.

Furthermore,

he has failed to establish that failure to record closing
arguments affected the outcome of the trial, or because
of comments made during the closing arguments, review on
appeal.
Thus, respondent submits that appellant's
contention is without merit on two grounds:

First, as

a general rule, reporting of closing arguments is not
custo~arily

practiced but is discretionary with the

judge and counsel; and secondly, the discretionary
choice to request reporting of closing arguments is
often used as a strategy or trial tactic of the
particular attorney in charge of the case.

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT III
EVIDENCE ADMITTED AS TO THE OCCUPATION
OF ONE OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES AND A
STATEMENT AS TO THE FACT THAT APPELLANT
HAD BEEN IN PRISON WERE ISOLATED,
UNHIGHLIGHTED COMMENTS AND NOT PPE,TllDICIAL
TO APPELL·\NT AND THEREFORE NOT GROUNDS FOR
REVERSAL ON APPEAL.
Appellant contends that the introduction of
evidence revealing that State's witness Kent Curtis
was an Adult Probation and Parole Office and had known
the appellant for approximately ten years and the subsequent statement by State's witness Ronald Ziegler on
cross-examination by then defense attorney Nash that
he had met appellant in prison were statements received
as evidence through prosecutorial misconduct

~nd

thus

constitute prejudicial error.
Respondent submits that appellant's contention
is both inaccurate and incorrect for the following reason
First, the comment made by witness Ziegler wa!; heard on
cross-examination of that witness by the defense
for appellant.

attorn~

Assuming as respondent contends that

appellant's trial counsel was effective and provided
reasonably competent representation, it may well be
that he chose to either discredit the State's witness,
rather than defendant, by introducing the fact

that

Ziegler had also been in prison or to let tho statement
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rc~1ain

insirJnificant and uncommented upon in order to

avoid einphetsizin9 the
a motion to strike.

~wtter

before the jury by making

If the defense attorney's failure

to object was purposeful and he was giving competent
representation as respondent contends, then that action
constitutes a waiver and bar to raising that issue for
review on appeal.

Watkins v. State, 560 P.2d 921 (Nev.

1977); State v. French, 531 P.2d 373

(Mont. 1975);

Mullin v. State, 505 P.2d 305 (Wyo. 1973).

On the

other hand, if the defense attorney's failure to object
was not purposeful, then the comment, standing alone,
was so insignificant as to constitute harmless error.
See State v. Archuletta, 577 P.2d 547 (Utah 1978).
In the recent case of United States v. Sigal,
572 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1978), comments made by a
prosecutor regarding defendant's failure to testify
were determined by the court to be harmless error.

In

Sigal, which can be analogous to the comments made in
this case, the court stated:
"Here the comment was not
extensive, there was minimal
stress . • • and there was
no substantial evidence which
supported an acquittal."
Id.
at 1323.
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Thus, the comment made by witness Ziegler was but an
isolated, unhighlighted

state~ent

and therefore not

prejudicial to appellant.
As to appellant's second contention that the
prosecutor intentionally introduced evidence that the
Adult Probation and Parole Officer, Kent Curtis, had
known the appellant for ten years, thus implicating
that appellant had a prior conviction for a crime and

h~

been in prison, it is a general rule that a witness may
be examined about his background, occupation, and the
like for the purpose of aiding the jury in evaluating
his testimony and credibility.
P.2d 188 (Ariz. 1976).

State v.

Brewe~,

549

In the instant case, witness

Curtis was asked simply to state his name, occupation,
and how long he had known the defendant.

Herc again

the failure of the defense attorney to object could have
been trial strategy; perhaps he did not want to stress
the fact and felt it was unnecessary to object.

Assumin

as respondent contends, that defense counsel was an
effective attorney, rendering reasonable, competent
representation, if he failed to voice objection he
cannot raise the issue for review on appeal.
Utah Code Ann.

§

78-24-9

Further,

(1953), as amended, provides

that "a witness must answer as to the fact of his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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previ~

con vi c ti on of fr:lony," ancl thus tho prosecution had
the eight, sanctioned by statute, to adduce evidence
of arpellant's prior felony convictions once appellant
took the stand; therefore appellant's contention is
without merit.

Also, had the evidence been directly

introduced rather than as it was, by inference, the
evidence of prior convictions for burglary could have
been admitted to show intent, knowledge, or absence of
mistake or accident.

See Rule 55, Utah Rules of

Evidence, and State v. Crowley, 552 P.2d 971

(Kan. 1976).

In addition, the evidence of prior convictions could have
been introduced to impeach appellant's credibility once
he had taken the stand.

Rule 21, Utah Rules of Evidence,

allows evidence of crimes involving dishonesty or false
statement to be introduced for purposes of impeaching a
witness' credibility.
971

In State v. Crowley, 552 P.2d

(Kan. 1976), the court stated:
"Burglary and larceny are
crines involving dish=~esty
and conviction of those offenses
may be shown for purposes of
impairing the credibility of a
witness." Id. at 975.
Thus, the comments adduced by the prosecutor

were elicited during fundamental foundation questions
to the State's witness; they were not emphasized nor
hiqh l i cih tccl hy further testimony and therefore are not

[n,·judicial to appellant.
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Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 (1974), the prosecuting
attorney had inquired as to whether the defendant, on
trial for robbery and assault with a deadly weapon, had
used the same gun to perpetrate another robbery.

Yet

even these comments, certainly more serious than those
made in the instant case, were not enough to reverse
the conviction.

In Hodges, the Court stated:
" • • • there should be no
reversal of a conviction merely
because of error or irregularity,
but only if it is substantial
and prejudicial in the sense that
in its absence there is a reasonable
likelihood that there would have been
a different result."
(Emphasis added.)
Id. at 1325.

Respondent contends that the comments complaine
of by appellant were not objected to at trial by his
defense attorney, who respondent believes effectively
represented appellant in a reasonable, competent manner,
and therefore are not an issue that can be raised on
appeal.

Respond'2rit further contends that the con<lents

were isolated, unhighlighted comments and thus not
prejudicial to appellant.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that in
view of the arguments presented above, appellant's
conviction of burglary should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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